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CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
CODE SECTION 317: ADVOCATING A
CHANGE TO REQUIRE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL FOR ALL CHILDREN
I. INTRODUCTION
Children have been viewed traditionally as extensions of their par-
ents' rather than as individuals in their own right.2 The traditional focus
is on the parental duty to protect and the right to care for children be-
cause children lack the maturity and rationality to care for themselves.3
The assumption is that a child and his or her parent will usually have
identical interests.4 A child's right to personal autonomy 5- including
the right to protection from intervention by the state 6- actually derives
from the parent's right to make important choices in family matters.7
1. The use of the word "parent" encompasses both the singular and plural.
2. Coons & Mnookin, Toward a Theory of Children's Rights, in THE CHILD AND THE
COURTS 391 (1978). See also McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the
Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 210 (1978). The
traditional view is a product of English common law as it was at the time of the American
colonization. Id. at 217.
3. Montgomery, Children as Property?, 51 MOD. L. REv. 323, 332 (1988).
4. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guard-
ian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 16, 18 (1976).
5. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
6. W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
47 (1983) [hereinafter CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM].
7. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The United States Supreme Court
has said that the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution gives parents the
"freedom of personal choice in matters of family life." Id. The Court has noted that the
"Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family
is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
In 1923, the Court had to decide the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute which man-
dated that only the English language be taught in private or public school. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court noted that education had "always" been extremely important
to the American people. Id. at 400. The Court concluded that parents had a duty to educate
the children they had control over. Id. If parents wanted to allow their children to learn
another language, the Court said, the parents had the right to such instruction. Id. Following
Meyer, the Court has repeatedly held that parents have a duty to their children as well as the
power to control them. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (state law
requiring all children to attend school until age 16 must exempt children whose parents' reli-
gious beliefs do not allow such attendance); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (federal act requiring parents to send children to public school interferes with liberty of
parents to direct children's upbringing and education).
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However, sometimes a parent will act in a manner that may be con-
trary to the best interests of the child.' When the state decides that a
parent is not acting in his or her child's best interests, 9 the state may
bring an action against the parent.' °
In California, if the state brings an action against the parent, alleg-
ing child abuse or neglect, the very young child could well become a
mere bystander in a game of legal "tug-of-war." The quiescent child
waits as the state and the parent, two forceful sources of power, struggle
to gain control. Both the state and the parent proclaim that they are
maintaining the struggle so as to attain the child's best interests. Some-
times the child's interests would be best served if the parent prevailed; at
other times, the child might be in a better position if the court were to
follow the state's recommendations; sometimes neither the parent's posi-
tion nor the state's position will adequately further the child's interests.
The child's best interests would be furthered by the appointment of an
independent advocate who could participate in the struggle on behalf of
the child. I
8. See, eg., In re Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783, 784 (1985); In re
Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 198, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 697 (1981); In re La Shonda B., 95
Cal. App. 3d 593, 596, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 281 (1979).
9. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 603; In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 836, 662 P.2d 922, 928,
191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 470 (1983). This "best interests" standard is codified in California law.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245.5 (West 1984). Its basic purpose is to "maximize a
child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult." In re Michelle T., 44 Cal.
App. 3d 699, 704, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (1975). See also In re Jessica B., 207 Cal. App. 3d
504, 254 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1989); In re Solomon L., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 236 Cal. Rptr. 2
(1987); In re Raymond H., 175 Cal. App. 3d 556, 221 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1985); In re Jamie M.,
134 Cal. App. 3d 530, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1982). But see Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the 'best interests of the child'
standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their
own personal values").
10. The state may regulate families based on the doctrine of parens patriae as well as
through its police power. Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. Under the police
power, the state may prevent one citizen from harming another. Id. In contrast, parens pa-
triae revolves around the state's paternalistic interest in protecting children. Id. at 1199.
Parens patriae "refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 579 (5th ed. 1983). In the child-
dependency area, the state may supersede parental power if the child's parents are "unfit" or
"unable" to properly care for the child. Developments in the Law, supra at 1201-02, The state
seeks justice by becoming a quasi-parent for a child alleged to be at risk of parental abuse.
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1 CHILDREN'S LEGAL Rrs. J., July/Aug. 1979, at 36, 37.
11. See, e.g., In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1056-59, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201-03
(1986); Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 7-10, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 786-88; In re David C., 152 Cal.
App. 3d 1189, 1207-08, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115, 127 (1984). See also infra notes 222-88 and accom-
panying text.
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California Welfare and Institutions Code section 31712 addresses the
right to counsel in the juvenile dependency court system, which operates
to protect the abused or neglected child.13 Under section 317, the Cali-
fornia Legislature does not provide mandatory independent counsel for
children.14 The statute allows independent representation to be accorded
at the court's discretion.15 The court will accord a child independent
counsel providing the court determines that the child would benefit from
counsel or finds that a conflict exists between the child and the child
welfare agency.16 However, in practice, a child must rely on the agency's
attorney to disclose a conflict to the court.17 If the court fails to find a
conflict between the child welfare agency and the child, the child will be
represented by the agency's counsel."8 This practice fails to take into
account the state's inherent conflict with the child's interests. 19 The
practice is ineffective in furthering the child's best interests because the
agency's attorney is advocating for a client who can never solely focus on
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
13. Specifically, this section of the Code provides:
317. Appointment of counsel
(b) When it appears to the court that a parent.., of the minor is unable to
afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, and the minor has been placed in
out-of-home care, or the [child welfare] agency is recommending that the minor be
placed in out-of-home care, the court shall appoint counsel, unless the court finds
that the parent ... has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.
(c) In any case in which it appears to the court that the minor would benefit
from the appointment of counsel the court shall appoint counsel for the minor...
The court shall determine if representation of both the [child welfare] agency and the
minor constitutes a conflict of interest. If the court finds there is a conflict of interest,
separate counsel shall be appointed for the minor.
Id. (emphasis added).
California supports a child welfare system through county child welfare agencies. Id.
§ 16500. Each county maintains operation of a child welfare service program. Id. Per Code
section 16501, "child welfare services" are directed at the following: "(a) protecting and pro-
moting the welfare of all children .... (b) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution
of problems which may result in the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children;
(c) preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families .... " Id. § 16501.
If a report of neglect or abuse is made to the county welfare agency, then the agency must
assess the situation through the use of "collateral contacts, a review of previous referrals, and
other relevant information .... " Id. § 16504.
14. Id. § 317.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1054, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (1986);
Demchak, Abused and Neglected Children, YOUTH L. NEWS 23, 28 (1988). This practice is
particularly dangerous for children four years of age or younger because a young child cannot
verbalize to the agency that he or she is aware of a conflict. Further, even children who can
verbalize a conflict may not have the conflict recognized. Kline, Children of the Court, CAL.
LAW., Sept. 1989, at 69, 72.
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
19. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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the child's best interests.20
Section 317 has additional inadequacies. For example, section
317(e) requires that the child be "interviewed" by the child's counsel at
or prior to the detention hearing if the child is four years of age or
older.2" The purpose of this interview is to "determine the minor's
wishes and to assess the minor's well-being."2 Children under four
years of age do not have to be interviewed by counsel.2 3 Without an
interview, the well-being of young children cannot be assessed by coun-
sel.24 Consequently, counsel lacks personal knowledge about the child
and can show neither that independent counsel would benefit the child
nor that a conflict exists between the state and the child. This, in es-
sence, completely obliterates the chances of a child under the age of four
being granted independent counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
whether children in juvenile dependency court proceedings are constitu-
tionally guaranteed independent counsel.2" In the absence of a Supreme
Court holding that these children have the right to independent counsel,
children's rights advocates will need to convince state legislatures that
independent counsel is necessary for fair proceedings that will further the
child's best interests.26
This Comment addresses the need for independent counsel for each
child 7 entering the California juvenile dependency court system. First,
the Comment gives an overview of the protective service system and de-
20. See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 58 U.S.L.W. 4184 (1990); see
also infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1990).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. See, eg., David C, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 1207, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 127. See also Michelle
T., 44 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
25. Demchak, supra note 17, at 28. The Court has, however, held that independent coun-
sel must be granted to juveniles in delinquency court proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41
(1966).
26. Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1879
(1987). Unfortunately, children cannot vote or lobby; thus, they are economically and politi-
cally powerless to advocate their own position. Id.
27. Although the proposed amendment to the Code, see infra notes 352-58 and accompa-
nying text, will affect all children, the focus is on children under four years of age because these
children cannot usually verbalize a conflict and the state does not require an independent
assessment of these young children's well-being. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
Although section 317 does give the courts discretion to appoint independent counsel for a
child, most of the time the courts automatically appoint the local child welfare agency's coun-
sel to represent the child. S. HONEA, ATTORNEYS' GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA DEPENDENCY
CHILD CUSTODY LAW 68-69 (1980). The courts do so in the belief that the agency will serve
the child's best interests. Ia
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scribes the inherent conflict between the parent, the child, and the state.
The Comment then analyzes both the conflict and state practices in de-
tail, highlighting United States Supreme Court decisions, California case
law, and the rationales which support requiring independent counsel for
children in dependency court. The analysis will show why section 317 is
not effective in furthering a child's best interests. Finally, the Comment
proposes an amendment to section 317 of the California Welfare and In-
stitutions Code. The author concludes that anything less than
mandatory independent counsel for children conflicts with the state's in-
tent-clearly outlined in both the statute and in case law-to further a
child's interests in dependency proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, family matters have been the concern of the state, as
opposed to the federal, government.28 Although the "integrity of the
family" is protected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution,29 the state may control families
within certain parameters.30
The conflict between family members, as where a parent abuses a
child, and the conflict between the state and family members create im-
pediments to the California Legislature's drafting of child-protective stat-
utes. Under current Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 through
399,31 the state is placed in the impossible position of protecting the in-
terests of the child and the parent.32 In addition, the state is interested in
protecting its own interests.33 The state's legal position is further compli-
cated because the state's counsel is also commonly appointed to represent
28. See Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1159.
29. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
30. Minow, supra note 26, at 1882 n.82. The expansion of protection for children has lead
to "greater judicial power and discretionary control over families." Id. The state can regulate
family life in order to "[strengthen] the family as a valuable social institution." Developments
in the Law, supra note 10, at 1160.
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300-99 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
32. For example, the Code emphasizes that the state should protect the best interests of
the child. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245.5 (West 1984). This best interests standard must
consider the child's "need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to
provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary
placements." Id. § 352(a). At the same time, the Code protects parental interests by provid-
ing that the state will not dictate specific parenting methods. Id. § 300(j) (West 1984 & Supp.
1990). The Code also provides that the state should focus on family reunification, which fur-
thers parents' interest in the care and control of their children, but which may not coincide
with the child's best interests. Id. §§ 361.5, 300(j).
33. See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
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the dependent child,34 particularly the child who is four years of age or
younger.35 If section 317 were amended to require independent counsel
for every child entering the system, the state would no longer be in such a
difficult legal position. Most importantly, the individual rights of each
child would be more specifically addressed.
To comprehend why this change is necessary and how it can be ac-
complished, an understanding of certain code sections and court proce-
dures is essential. Such knowledge will clarify the current situation and
emphasize how the legislature can minimize the problem of conflicting
rights and interests.
A. California Juvenile Dependency Procedures
In California, a child may be removed from the home of his or her
parent and placed into temporary protective custody 36 if a peace officer
has reasonable cause to believe that the child has suffered harm or
there is a risk that the child will suffer harm37 from parental abuse or
34. See S. HONEA, supra note 27, at 68-69.
35. The court only declares a conflict if a conflict is presented to the court. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990). A child does not even have to be seen or interviewed by
counsel unless the child is four years of age or older. Id. See also supra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text. Thus, the court must rely on the state agency's evaluation of the child's
situation.
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. § 305 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). Under section 305, a
peace officer may take a child into temporary custody if he or she has reasonable cause to
believe the child falls within one of the provisions of section 300. Id. "Protective custody" has
been defined as "[t]he condition of one who is held under force of law for his own protection
.... " BLACK'S LAW DICnTONARY 639 (5th ed. 1983).
37. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990). This section defines the children
who come within the jurisdiction of the court. Section 300 provides in pertinent part:
Any minor who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent
child of the court:
(a) The minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor's
parent .... For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substan-
tial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury
was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the minor or the minor's
siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent ... which indicate
the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, "seri-
ous physical harm" does not include reasonable and age appropriate spanking to the
buttocks where there is no evidence of serious physical injury.
(b) The minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or
her parent ... to adequately supervise or protect the minor, or the willful or negli-
gent failure of the minor's parent ... to adequately supervise or protect the minor
from the conduct of the custodian with whom the minor has been left, or by the
willful or negligent failure of the parent ... to provide the minor with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent ... to provide
regular care for the minor due to the parent's . . . mental illness, developmental
1390
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neglect.38  The peace officer then contacts the county child welfare
disability, or substance abuse. No minor shall be found to be a person described by
this subdivision solely due to the lack of an emergency shelter for the family....
(c) The minor is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of
suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, or with-
drawal, untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct
of the parent....
(d) The minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the
minor will be sexually abused.., by his or her parent.., or member of his or her
household, or the parent.., has failed to adequately protect the minor from sexual
abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the
minor was in danger of sexual abuse.
(e) The minor is under the age of five and has suffered severe physical abuse by
a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably
should have known that the person was physically abusing the minor. For the pur-
poses of this subdivision, "severe physical abuse" means any of the following: any
single act of abuse which causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left
untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disa-
bility, or death; any single act of sexual abuse which causes significant bleeding, deep
bruising, or significant external or internal swelling; or more than one act of physical
abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal
swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness....
(f) The minor's parent ... has been convicted of causing the death of another
child through abuse or neglect.
(g) The minor has been left without any provision for support; the minor's par-
ent has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the
minor; or... the whereabouts of the parent is unknown, and reasonable efforts to,
locate the parent have been unsuccessful.
(h) The minor has been freed for adoption ....
(i) The minor has been subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent... or
a member of his or her household ....
(j) The minor's sibling has been abused or neglected ....
Id.
38. Id. The number of reported cases of child abuse is increasing. Edwards, The Relation-
ship of Family and Juvenile Courts in Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 201, 203
n.5 (1987). Statistics reveal that in 1980, California had 175,200 reported child abuse cases.
Id. There was an increase in 1985 to 295,769 reported cases. Id. The number of children
under three years of age who are entering the dependency court system is increasing at an
"alarming" rate. Health Alarm for Foster Care, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at A3, col. 2.
Between 1986 and 1989, the number nearly doubled, rising from 9,500 in 1986 to more than
18,000 in 1989. Id.
Further, a report by the Inter-Agency Council on Child Abuse and Neglect shows that
child-abuse related deaths have substantially increased. Area Child-Abuse Deaths Double,
Daily News (L.A.), Oct. 18, 1989, at 4, col. 2. The Los Angeles juvenile courts supervise
35,000 abused children and receive approximately 1,200 new cases each month. Kline, supra
note 17, at 69. Some of this increase is due to an increase in actual incidents of abuse.
Demchak, supra note 16, at 23. However, the increase also reflects the expansion of child
protective services. Id. Children's Services workers in Los Angeles County currently average
60 ongoing cases per month. Kline, supra note 17, at 70. Recently, the union representing Los
Angeles County Children's Services social workers sought to put a cap on social worker
caseloads. Children's Social Workers Threaten Strike in County, Daily News (L.A.), Sept. 8,
1989, at 4, col. 2. The Service Employees International Union (Union) successfully negotiated
a new contract with Los Angeles County, averting a walkout. Child Welfare Workers' Union
Ratifies Contract, Daily News (L.A.), Oct. 3, 1989, at 4, col. 5. The County promised to hire
269 additional caseworkers. Id. According to the news report, the hiring of new caseworkers
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agency,3 9 and the agency decides whether it should take custody of the
child.4°
In deciding whether to take custody of the child or to release the
child to his or her parent, the county child welfare agency must consider
if there is any reasonable way to insure the child's safety without remov-
ing the child from parental custody.4' If the agency feels that the child
needs to remain in the agency's custody, the agency retains the child and
then informs the parent of the child's detention.42 The agency may then
place the child in the home of a relative, in a foster home, or in a commu-
nity care facility.43
Next, the county child welfare agency files a petition against the
parent." The first hearing, the detention hearing,45 is, held two judicial
days later.4" At the detention hearing, the child (if present) and the par-
ent of the child are told why the child was taken into protective cus-
will result in a reduction of worker caseloads from between 80 and 120 cases to between 40 and
50 cases. IdL
The agreement between the Union and the County did not require a "cap" on caseloads.
Id. Further, even though the County will now be decreasing caseloads to between 40 and 50
cases per social worker, it should be noted that the Child Welfare League of America recom-
mends that social workers have an ongoing caseload of not more than 17 cases per month.
Kline, supra note 17, at 70. Thus, even with the new contract, the average Los Angeles
County social worker still handles more than twice as many cases as is recommended. This
places a difficult burden on each worker.
39. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). Section 306 pertains to
the duties of the county child welfare agency. This section provides: "Before taking a minor
into custody a social worker shall consider whether there are any reasonable services available
to the worker which, if provided to the minor's parent.., would eliminate the need to remove
the minor from the custody of his or her parent.... ." Id. The California Legislature expressly
notes that preservation of the family is the focus of the dependency court. Id. § 3000). The
Code also provides that the court "shall order" the child welfare agency to provide services to
the child and the child's parents in order to facilitate reunification. Id. § 361.5(a). At least one
California court has noted the "dual purpose" of dependency proceedings. See In re La
Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1979). The dual purpose,
according to the court, is "to protect the welfare of the minor and to safeguard parents' right
to properly raise their own child." Id. (emphasis added). In Santosky v. Kramer, Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent also noted this dual purpose. 455 U.S. 745, 780 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
40. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). The duties of the county
child welfare agency are subject to the regulations of the State Department of Social Services.
Id. § 202.5. Although this section of the Code discusses "probation officers," the Code in-
cludes child welfare agency social workers within this definition. Id. § 215.
41. Id. § 306.
42. Id. § 307.4.
43. Id. § 361.2.
44. Id. § 332.
45. Id. § 315. This section states that the detention hearing is held to "determine whether
the minor shall be further detained." Id.
46. Id § 313.
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tody.4 7 These parties are also informed of their right to representation by
court-appointed counsel.48 The parent is advised that counsel will be ap-
pointed if he or she cannot afford to employ counsel.49 The court has the
discretion to appoint independent counsel for the child."
B. The Conflicting Interests of State, Parent and Child
A parent has a duty to protect his or her child.51 In California, if a
parent fails to protect the child, then the state, through each county child
welfare agency, may supersede parental authority and retain jurisdiction
over the child. 2 However, although the parent and the state have duties
to protect the child, it cannot be assumed that either of them will com-
pletely serve the child's interests. 3
The state's duty to protect the child is coupled with the state's duty
to the parent who has allegedly harmed the child.54 However, this duty
to the parent is joined with the state's duty to file an action against the
parent.
55
47. Id. § 316. To be considered a dependent child and thus made a dependent of the
juvenile court system, a child must meet one of the definitions set forth in section 300. See
supra note 37 for the relevant provisions of section 300. In general, the definition of "depen-
dent child," for the purposes of the juvenile dependency court system, includes children who
have been neglected, or who have been physically, emotionally or sexually abused. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990).
48. Id. §§ 316-17.
49. Id. § 317(b).
50. Id. § 317(c).
51. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213 (1972)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-(1923).
52. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 306, 16501, 16504 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
53. The United States Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he state [and] the natural parents...
are parties, and [both] contend that the position they advocate is most in accord with the rights
and interests of the [child]." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44
(1977). Since both the state and the parent will likely recommend that the court follow posi-
tions most favorable to their individual interests, it cannot be assumed that either party can
protect the child's best interests. Comment, Speaking for a Child The Role of Independent
Counsel for Minors, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 681, 686 (1987).
54. Parham, 442 U.S. at 605 (parenspatriae power of state also involves interest in "help-
ing parents") (emphasis added). In Parham, the issue presented to the Court concerned the
due process required for a child when the child's parents or the state determined that the child
should be confined to a mental care facility. Id. at 587.
In Santosky v. Kramer, Justice Rehnquist noted that New York's child welfare system
"seeks not only to protect the interests of parents in rearing their own children, but also to
assist and encourage parents who have lost custody of their children to reassume their rightful
role." 455 U.S. 745, 780 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Fully understood," Justice Rehn-
quist explained, "the New York system is a comprehensive program to aid parents .... " Id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000) (West Supp. 1990).
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 311 (West 1984). This section provides in pertinent part:
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In addition, the state has administrative burdens that conflict with
the child's best interests. For example, the time spent on each case de-
creases as the number of children entering the juvenile system in-
creases.5 6 Due to time constraints, many social workers disregard the
child-protective rules to which they should adhere.57 This leads to an
increase in error." One county child welfare agency, the Department of
Children's Services in Los Angeles County, recently has been accused of
failing to take prompt action in dangerous situations.5 9 In one incident, a
foster home had ten children sleeping on the floor of the garage.' Ten
more children were living in a single bedroom. 61 Another foster home
had twenty infants sleeping in ten cribs, although the home was only
licensed for four children.62 In this last incident, when the County finally
took action and removed the infants from the foster home, social workers
had difficulty identifying the children.63
(a) If the probation officer [or other child protection services representative] de-
termines that the minor shall be retained in custody he [or she] shall immediately file
a petition... with the clerk of the juvenile court who shall set the matter for hearing
on the detention hearing calendar. The probation officer shall thereupon notify each
parent ... of the hearing... and shall serve those persons entitled to notice of the
hearing... with a copy of the petition and notify those persons of the time and place
of the detention hearing.
Id.
56. Patton, Forever Torn Asunder: Charting Evidentiary Parameters, the Right to Compe-
tent Counsel and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in California Child Dependency and
Parental Severance Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 299, 300-02 (1987). See also supra note
38 for an overview of the increase in child abuse and the burden such increase puts on the
agency workers.
57. Patton, supra note 56, at 300-01.
58. Id. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998
(1989). In this case, a four-year-old child, Joshua, was rendered permanently and profoundly
retarded due to his father's abuse. Id. at 1002; see also Reidinger, Why Did No One Protect
This Child?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 48, 49. The county child welfare agency of Winnebago
County, Wisconsin, in a gross error, had made a decision "not to devote [its] limited resources
to [the] particular task" of protecting Joshua. Reidinger, supra, at 51.
The mother of Joshua brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), stating that
Joshua's due process liberty interest in bodily integrity had been violated by the state's actions.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1000. Section 1983 provides that a person may bring suit against
another when deprived of a constitutional right. Id. The United States Supreme Court held
that the state should not be held responsible for the actions of private actors. Id. at 1007.
According to the Court, the due process clause does not impose a duty on a state to protect its
citizens from one another. Id. at 1003. The Court said the harm to Joshua did not occur when
he was in the state's custody; thus, there was no constitutional duty to protect him. Id at
1006.
59. CountyAccused of Letting Foster Children Suffer Abuse, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1990, at
A3, col. 1.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id at A25, col. 1.
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The decisions of child welfare agencies are also affected by budget-
ary concerns. The state wants judicial decisions to be made economi-
cally, which may include limiting the number of court-appointed
counsel. 6" Based on the state's varied concerns, it is not surprising that
studies indicate that the agencies may be parenting as poorly as the
parents. 5
Just as it cannot be assumed that the state is exclusively pursuing
the child's interests, it is also wrong to presume that the parent is con-
cerned exclusively with the child's best interests. Dependency proceed-
ings are instigated because of alleged parental abuse.66 Parental abuse of
a child evinces the parent's failure to protect the child and clearly con-
flicts with the child's interests. In dependency proceedings, the parent
may be more concerned about regaining custody and control over his or
her child and opposing the allegations made by the state rather than con-
cerned with the child's best interests.
67
The child has an interest in a stable, loving home.68 Denial of stabil-
ity courts "emotional disaster.",69 The need for love and stability does
not require biological ties.70 A child's interest in love and stability, thus,
may conflict with the birth parent's traditional right to parent. It may
64. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 (States want decisions "to be made as economically as possible
... to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings
his [or her] presence may cause."). Foster care of children taken into state custody is also an
economic concern for the state. Patton, supra note 56, at 313.
65. See, e.g., Health Alarr for Foster Care, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at A3, col. 2.
66. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990).
67. See, eg., In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1051, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197-98
(1986); In re Jamie M., 134 Cal. App.- 3d 530, 533, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (1982); In re
Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 197, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698 (1981).
68. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982). It has
been noted that "[e]ven beyond theories of child development, psychologists have begun to
identify the capacity to form commitments and connections to others, rather than autonomy,
as the destination for the maturing person." Minow, supra note 26, at 1883-84. See also In re
Raymond H., 175 Cal. App. 3d 556, 564, 221 Cal. Rptr. 165, 169 (1985) (best interest of child
served by giving child stability and security); In re Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 706, 117
Cal. Rptr. 856, 860 (1975) (noting importance to child of continuity of parental relationships)
(citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
32 (1973)).
69. In re Marcos, 73 Cal. App. 3d 768, 783, 140 Cal. Rptr. 912, 920 (1977). See also
Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d at 706, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60. In Michelle T., the appellate
court took judicial notice of an authority on child development, noting that the Supreme Court
of California had already cited the source. Id. (citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)). The court stressed that "'[p]hysical,
emotional, intellectual, social, and moral growth does not happen without causing the child
inevitable internal difficulties. The instability of all mental process during the period of devel-
opment needs to be offset by stability and uninterrupted support from external sources."' Id.
(quoting BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD).
70. McGough & Shindell, supra note 2, at 242.
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also conflict with the state's duty to protect the birth parent's interest in
rearing his or her own birth child. The child, then, may not receive the
full benefit of legal services from either the parent's or the state's attor-
ney. Neither attorney can adequately represent both the child and the
attorney's primary client in dependency proceedings.71 Under Califor-
nia's welfare and Institutions Code, the parent's attorney never repre-
sents the child; the Code allows the state's attorney, however, to
represent the child.72
1. Parental interests in child protection proceedings
a. the constitutional source
The parental interest in the custody and care of children "occupies a
unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the
focus for personal meaning and responsibility.""3 The law presumes that
the "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children."'74 A parent's interest is deferred to and protected unless
there is a "powerful countervailing interest."7
Birth parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of
their children.76 The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated
that this fundamental interest does not "evaporate simply because [the
parents] have not been model parents."77 Due to this fundamental right
to parent, state laws may not punish those parents who do not conform
to model standards.78 The law is not intended to punish non-conformity,
because child-care customs may vary from culture to culture.79 Consti-
tutionally, parents have the right to raise their children in the manner the
parents deem appropriate, although this right may be limited by the
state.80
71. Doing so would impinge on the duty of an attorney to zealously represent his or her
client and the duty to avoid a conflict of interest. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980); CAL. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT 3-310.
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
73. Lassiter, 452 U.S at 38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
75. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
76. Id. See also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
77. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a
vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.").
78. In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 837, 662 P.2d 922, 929, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 471 (1983).
79. Montgomery, supra note 3, at 326.
80. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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b. the state source
Parents have the right to raise their children because the law as-
sumes that parents will provide for their children what their children
cannot provide for themselves."1 The state's policy to avoid interfering in
parenting decisions is codified in California. For example, section 300 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code expressly states that protec-
tion of a child "shall focus on the preservation of the family whenever
possible."
82
The right to parent is also evident in California case law. The fun-
damental right to parent is supreme; thus, the state may only disturb this
right if a parent acts in a manner inconsistent with parenthood."3 The
California courts have reiterated statutory intent by noting the "[j]udicial
concern ... for the need to strengthen family ties." 4
The courts construe statutes and examine the circumstances to en-
courage a parent's right to parent, generally allowing a parent more than
one chance to accomplish successful parenting.8" Of course, if the parent
does jeopardize the child's health or safety, the state steps in.8 6
2. State interests in child protection proceedings
a. the constitutional source
Parental rights have always been recognized in the United States.87
A legal presumption exists that a parent does what is best for his or her
child, although the presumption may be rebutted by evidence of child
neglect or abuse.88 Thus, if a parent does not protect a child, the state
81. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 598 P.2d .36, 44, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 391 (1979) (the "essence [of parenting] lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual
guidance the parent gives to the child throughout his formative years, and often beyond....
[I]ts motive power is parental love and concern for the child's well-being.").
82. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300G) (West Supp. 1990). The statute further provides:
"Nothing in this section is intended to disrupt-the family unnecessarily or to intrude inappro-
priately into family life, to prohibit the use of reasonable methods of parental discipline, or to
prescribe a particular method of parenting." Id. See also section 16507, which states that
family reunification services shall be provided or arranged by county welfare department staff
in order to reunite the child separated from his or her parent because of abuse, neglect, or
exploitation. Id. § 16507.
83. See, e.g., In re Solomon L., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 1112, 236 Cal. Rptr. 2, 4 (1987).
84. Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 205, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
85. See generally Solomon L., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 236 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1987); In re
Christina P., 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 220 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1985).
86. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
87. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22
GA. L. REV. 975, 975 (1988).
88. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
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can intervene under its power ofparens patriae. 8 9 Under the doctrine of
parens patriae, the state may protect the child by extending its dominion
over the child, thereby usurping parental authority.90 This doctrine per-
mits the state to determine what steps are necessary to protect the health,
safety and welfare of the child.91 The state also has a substantial interest
in children growing up to become self-sufficient adults capable of assum-
ing the responsibility of governing.92 Thus, the state has an interest para-
mount to that of the parent when it finds a parent unfit.93
b. the state source
Under its power of parens patriae, California established the Juve-
nile Court94 to protect children's interests.95 The California Legislature
expressly stated that its intent was to "provide maximum protection for
children who are... at risk."
'96
At one time, parental rights were nearly limitless. 97 However, in the
20th century, states began to exercise power over the child in cases of
abuse. 98 In the mid-1960s,99 California and other states began to pass
child-protective statutes that gave the states jurisdiction to render serv-
ices to both the child and the child's family"°° and established that the
89. Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1198. See also supra notes 8-10 and accom-
panying text.
90. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978).
See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). In Gault, the Supreme Court noted that parens patriae
"proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from
the constitutional scheme," but, the Court said, "its meaning is murky.. . ." Id. at 16.
91. Demchak, supra note 17, at 24.
92. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (society relies on "'healthy, well-
rounded growth'" of children into" 'full maturity as citizens' ") (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)). Justice Rehnquist also noted that "children who are abused in
their youth generally face extraordinary problems developing into responsible, productive citi-
zens," and that "[t]he same can be said of children who, tliough not physically or emotionally
abused, are passed from one foster home to another with no constancy of love, trust, or disci-
pline." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27
(state has "urgent interest" in child welfare); Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 10, at 43.
93. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 524 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Dissenting in Lehman, Justice
Blackmun cited the common law for the proposition that a parent "is liable to be defeated by
his own wrongdoing or unfitness and by the demands and requirements of society that the
well-being of the child shall be deemed paramount to the natural rights of an unworthy par-
ent." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
94. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245 (West 1984).
95. Id. § 245.5.
96. Id. § 300(j) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
97. Fraser, supra note 4, at 25.
98. I at 26.
99. Demchak, supra note 17, at 23.
100. See Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 10, at 36.
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rights of parents were not absolute.1 Since then, parents' right to raise
their children has been subject to the state's statutory right to intervene
to protect the child's interests.
10 2
In juvenile dependency court proceedings in California, the child
welfare agency's attorneys advocate the agency's position against the par-
ent, supporting the allegations with evidence supplied by social work-
ers.10 3  For example, one piece of evidence admissible in juvenile
dependency proceedings is a social study report compiled by the child
welfare agency workers." 4 In preparing this report, the assigned social
worker interviews persons the worker feels have significant informa-
tion. 0  The agency's counsel then submits the report into evidence.' 6
In general, even if the parent has counsel, the state's vast resources
increase its chances of prevailing." 7 The county child welfare agency
has an attorney armed with "professional social workers who are em-
powered to investigate the family situation and to testify against the par-
ent."10 To prevail, "[t]he State marshals an array of public resources to
prove its case and disprove the parents' case."10 9 By advocating its posi-
tion vigorously, the state purports to protect its interest in the welfare of
its child citizenry.
3. The rights of children in child protection proceedings
a. the constitutional source
In 1979, in Parham v. J.R.,"' the United States Supreme Court ex-
101. See Demchak, supra note 17, at 23.
102. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
103. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
104. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); see also In re
Courtney S., 130 Cal. App. 3d 567, 575, 181 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-48 (1982).
105. See Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 10, at 43. For example, information can be
garnered from teachers, neighbors or psychiatrists. Id.
106. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
107. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763 ("State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs
the parents' ability to mount a defense.").
108. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
The United States Supreme Court has tellingly used the word "win" in discussing the
adversarial tone of juvenile dependency court proceedings. Id. at 764. The Court noted that
"[i]f the state initially fails to uwin termination . . . it always can try once again ... after
gathering more or better evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Although initial proceedings in
juvenile court might not result in actual termination of parental rights (as was the case in
Santosky), the detention of children by the state has been termed a constructive termination.
See Note, Parental Rights Termination: Are the Interests of Parents, Children, and the State
Mutually Exclusive? 17 STETSON L. REv. 295, 302-03 (1987).
110. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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pressly stated that children, in general, were protected by the same con-
stitutional rights accorded adults"' The Court stated that parental
rights and the theory of familial autonomy could not bar children's indi-
vidual constitutional rights. 112 Parental rights were "limited by the legit-
imate rights and interests of their children." ' 1 3 The Court noted the
existence of state statutes which limited parental rights by allowing "in-
tervention on behalf of neglected or abused children."' 14 The Court thus
implied that the states have a legitimate interest in ensuring the rights of
children, and that legislatures should enact statutes to protect these
rights.' 1'
111. Id. at 627 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). Parham involved a class action by children whose parents had
voluntarily committed them to state mental institutions under a state statute. Id. at 587-88.
The children contended that the statute was unconstitutional, depriving them of their due
process right to liberty because the statute required no formal adversarial hearing prior to the
child's detention. Id. at 588. The children argued that a parent's decision to admit a child to a
mental institution must be examined by a "formal, adversar[ial], pre-admission hearing." Id.
at 603.
The Court acknowledged that the children who had been committed to state mental insti-
tutions had a liberty interest, but held that the due process liberty interest could be protected
by a "neutral factfinder." Id. at 601, 606. This factfinder would determine whether the child
met statutory requirements for admission to the institution. Id. The Court noted that the
factfinder did not have to be either a judicial or administrative officer. Id. at 607. The staff
physician could serve as the factfinder if he or she could independently evaluate the child's
need for treatment from the perspective of the child's best interests. Id. at 618. Due process
did not require that the hearing be formal. Id. The Court said it did not believe that the risks
of error would be lessened by a formal hearing. Id. at 613. However, the Court admitted that
when the state-as the child's guardian-requested commitment, the risk was that the child
might become "lost in the shuffle." Id. at 619. In fact, one witness testified that child welfare
agencies misused the mental institutions as a dumping ground for children. Id. at 597, n.8.
112. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Although the Court espoused the constitutional rights of children, it then declared the
state's existing procedures constitutional, even though non-adversarial. Id. at 620. The Court
relied on the traditional presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children, and
the assumption that the state has an economic interest in institutionalizing only those children
who are in need of mental health treatment. Id. at 604-05. The Court said that the state's
interest included minimizing procedural obstacles so parents were not discouraged from seek-
ing help for their children. Id. at 605. The Court felt that adversarial procedures might stop
parents from getting their child help. Id.
Parham's factual situation can be distinguished from the circumstances that occur in the
juvenile dependency court system. In California, dependency proceedings are adversarial if
there are contested issues of fact or law. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1990). Additionally, the state does not have to minimize "procedural obstacles" because
a parent in juvenile dependency proceedings is not seeking help for his or her child; a child
comes to the attention of the juvenile dependency court when the state acts against the parent
1400
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Three years later, in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv-
ices, 1 6 the Court further enunciated children's rights and interests, de-
claring that it is "undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-
term, continuous relationships."' 17 In addition, the Court has recog-
nized that children have an interest in their own in safety."' The Court
has also noted that familial relationships are important to individuals be-
cause of the "emotional attachments" that occur, and that such emo-
tional attachments are a protected liberty interest. 1i9
b. the state source
Prior to the late 19th century, a child's interest in freedom from
parental abuse was not recognized in the United States." 0 In 1874, how-
ever, a suit was brought against the stepmother of a child who had been
repeatedly beaten and assaulted with a pair of scissors. 2' In finding the
stepmother guilty of child abuse, the court relied on the argument that
by alleging abuse of the child. Thus, Parham's rationale is incongruent with what occurs in
juvenile dependency proceedings.
What is gained from the Parhaq Court's decision is that children have the same constitu-
tional rights as adults. It does not follow that Parham stands for the proposition that children
in adversarial juvenile dependency court proceedings should go unrepresented by independent
counsel.
116. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
117. Id. at 513. It has also been acknowledged that children need "[a] stable, loving home-
life," and that a stable, loving home is "essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual
well-being." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Laura F, 33
Cal. 3d at 832, 662 P.2d at 926, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (1983); McGough & Shindell, supra note
2, at 211-12 ("In the area of the emotional deprivation or harm to [a child's] psychological
development.., the law has been [slow] to intervene on the child's behalf"). See also Children
of Divorce: Do They Have a Right to Counsel?, 3 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. Sept/Oct. 1981,
at 24, 26 [hereinafter Children of Divorce] ("the child's emotional concerns often fall on deaf
ears").
118. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (personal safety of severely
retarded persons in state custody is constitutionally protected). See also DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06 (1989). In DeShaney, the Court
clarified that Youngberg does not stand for the proposition that an individual has a substantive
due process right to governmental aid. Id. Rather, the Court said, Youngberg stands for the
idea that the state acquires a duty to protect when the state takes an individual into custody
against the individual's will, thus impinging a due process liberty interest. Id. The Court
noted that the courts of appeals in several circuits have held that the state could be liable for
"failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster
parents." Id. at 1006 n.9 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court expressed no view because
the issue was not before the Court. Id. See also Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Bouknight, 58 U.S.L.W. 4184 (1990) (state has interest in "care and safety" of child under
supervision of juvenile dependency court system).
119. Smith, 431 U.S. at 854.
120. McGough & Shindell, supra note 2, at 210.
121. Id. at 210 n.7 (citing Mary Ellen Wilson, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1874, at 8, col. 2,
reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 185-87 (R. Bremner ed. 1971)).
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children deserved protection because they were members of the animal
kingdom, and there were laws against cruelty to animals.' 22
Through the subsequent enactment of child-protective statutes,
states have attempted to secure the safety and best interests of each
child. 2 3 In California, the central premise behind the enactment of juve-
nile laws is the child's best interests.'2 4
California addresses this best interest standard in several areas. For
example, the Code provides that mere temporary removal of the child by
a county child welfare agency is not always in the child's best interests.125
The Code also notes that reunification with the parent is not necessarily
in the child's best interests. 26 The Code recognizes the drawbacks of
122. Id. (citing Mary Ellen Wilson). Children have been detained by the county child wel-
fare agencies for good reasons: In one case, a two-month-old infant was kicked and stomped
by a parent, leading to multiple skull fractures. La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d at 596, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 281. In another case, a child was removed after repeated beatings by her father
and was forced to sleep "in her underwear on a plastic sheet on the floor with no bedding in 60
degree weather as a punishment for [bed]wetting." Edward C, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 198, 178
Cal. Rptr. at 697. In yet another case, a nine-month-old was removed from her parents' cus-
tody after sustaining a skull fracture, broken wrists and ankle, and assorted bruises and abra-
sions. Patricia E, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 784. Aside from such physical
abuse, in 1986 alone, the Los Angeles County child welfare agency staff reported 3,126 cases of
child sexual abuse to the State Department of Social Services. Shafer, Child SexualAbuse and
the Law, 12 L.A. LAW. Sept. 1986, at 46.
123. See, eg., Ausz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-30-102
(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-101 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 415.501 (1986 & Supp. 1990);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-601 (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587-1 (1985 & Supp.
1987); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (1979 & Supp. 1989); IND. CODE § 31-6-1 1-1 (1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 218 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1989);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248 (Callaghan 1984 & Supp. 1989-90); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 411
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). See also Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not
Heard Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 131 (1984);
see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1989) (describing dependent children
subject to court's jurisdiction and stating legislative intent to protect children).
124. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245.5 (West 1984).
125. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 1990).
126. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. California favors reunification of a
child with the parent. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West Supp. 1990). Reunifi-
cation services include providing a "full array of social and health services to help the child
and family and to prevent reabuse of children." Id. § 3000) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). If the
child is old enough, the child can voice an opinion of what is in her or his best interest. Id.
§ 317(e). Section 317 of the Code provides that "[i]n any case in which the minor is four years
of age or older, counsel shall interview the minor to determine the minor's best wishes and to
assess the minor's well-being." Id.
California has stressed not only family reunification, but also the need to provide for
stable, permanent homes for children if family reunification is not successful. Id. § 366.25.
Section 366.25 provides:
(a) In order to provide stable, permanent homes for children, a court shall, if
the minor cannot be returned home.., conduct a permanency planning hearing to
make a determination regarding the future status of the minor no later than 12
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reunification and thus provides that reunification services are not neces-
sary when a parent's whereabouts are unknown.' 27 Similarly, reunifica-
tion is not the focus when a parent is so mentally disabled that he or she
cannot utilize reunification services. 2 ' In addition, a parent who has
caused the death of another child because of abuse or neglect may be
denied reunification services.
129
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 does not re-
quire mandatory independent counsel for children entering the juvenile
dependency court system.130 Currently, even though an inherent conflict
exists among the state, parent and child, 13 1 and all three are separate
parties in a juvenile dependency court action, 32 section 317 allows a
child to be represented by the same counsel as the county child welfare
agency. The court has the discretion to appoint independent counsel for
a child.133 However, before the court will grant independent counsel, the
agency attorney must declare that a conflict exists.' 4 This procedure
creates an inherent conflict because, without independent counsel, the
child is relying on the agency attorney to present the conflict to the court.
This lack of independent counsel may result in unfair court proceed-
ings.' 31 The child may end up abandoned in the juvenile dependency
court system.'
36
Without independent counsel, a child involved with the juvenile de-
pendency court never has an independent evaluation regarding his or her
best interests.137 The dependency hearings and the process leading to the
months after the original dispositional hearing... and in no case later than 18
months from the time of the minor's original placement....
Id.
This section also provides that, to give stability, the court consider adoption first, then legal
guardianship and, finally, long-term foster care. Further, if the child is currently in a foster
home, the foster parents will have priority in adopting the child. Id
127. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 1990).
128. Id.
129. Id
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c) (West Supp. 1990).
131. See supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text.
132. Edwards, supra note 38, at 217.
133. Demchak, supra note 17, at 28. See also supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
134. See Demchak, supra note 17, at 28. See also supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
135. See, eg., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-42 (1967).
136. See supra note 111. See also Kline, supra note 17, at 69.
137. The proposed statutory amendment requires that the child's independent counsel as-
sess and then relay to the court what would be in the child's best interests. See infra notes 352-
58 and accompanying text. In presenting facts to the court, counsel would take into account
the age and circumstances of the child, coupled with psychological recommendations made by
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dependency hearings may be conducted in a manner contrary to the
child's interests.138 If the county child welfare agency fails to act and the
child is harmed or neglected within the dependency court system, 139 no
one independently confronts the agency on the child's behalf. Thus,
without independent counsel, the child may be saved from parental abuse
only to be subsequently abused by the state."4
A. State Practices and Interests that Conflict with the Child's Interests
The county child welfare agency will often share its attorney with
experts in child development who are not affiliated with either the state or the parent. In-
dependent counsel would focus solely on the child's best interests, which would include assess-
ing the state's and the parent's positions in relation to the child's best interests. The state's and
parent's position is pertinent to independent counsel's evaluation because both the state and
parent assert that they are seeking the child's best interests.
138. A most recent example that came to the national forefront is Baltimore City Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 58 U.S.L.W. 4184 (1990) (holding that parent who had custody of
her child pursuant to juvenile dependency court order may not invoke fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination to resist order by court that she produce child). In this case, the
county child welfare agency of Baltimore had detained the three-month-old infant, Maurice,
after he was hospitalized with a fractured left femur, partially healed bone fractures and other
signs of extreme physical abuse. Id. at 4185. Hospital personnel had also seen Maurice's
mother, Bouknight, shaking the injured infant and dropping him into his crib. Id.
After several months in a foster home, Maurice was, in Justice O'Connor's words, "inex-
plicably" returned to his mother's custody. Id. Bouknight, who had an attorney, agreed to
cooperate with the agency, continue therapy and parental training classes and "refrain from
physically punishing [Maurice]." Id. (emphasis added). Approximately eight months later,
the agency reported to the local authorities and the juvenile court that Maurice was missing
and feared dead. Id.
The agency's decision to return Maurice to the home of the mother only months after she
had severely injured him is "inexplicable." It is also inexplicable that the agency allowed the
return of a six-month-old infant on the condition that the mother not "punish" the infant.
Punishment constitutes "a penalty imposed on an offender for a crime or wrongdoing." WEB-
STER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIoNARY 1462 (1983). Synonyms include to chastise, correct or dis-
cipline. Id. Defining the abuse Bouknight rendered on Maurice as overly-severe punishment
is illogical and profoundly disturbing. The agency's use of the word "punish" implies that
Maurice could behave in a manner that justified discipline. The author questions a six-month-
old infant's capability to behave in a manner that warrants discipline. However, because Mau-
rice did not have independent counsel, there was no one to confront the state agency's judg-
ment and lack of common sense. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Children's
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
139. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977) (noting that many children end up in foster-care limbo); In
re Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 708, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 861 (1975) (discussing bureau-
cratic uncertainty).
140. See CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 752 (citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 187-96 (1979)). Child
abuse by the state occurs when the child has been improperly removed from his or her family
or when the state improperly returns the child to the parent. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 187-96 (1979).
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the young child in juvenile dependency court.14 1 The child without in-
dependent counsel, therefore, will be subject to the agency's determina-
tion of the situation. For example, if the agency determines the child is
safe at home, the agency's counsel will advocate this position.
The child's interests might further suffer because the state must pro-
tect not only the child's interests, but also parental interests. 142 For ex-
ample, under section 330, even if the agency takes a child into custody,
the agency may immediately return the child to the parent's home if the
parent agrees to informal supervision. 143 In a section 330 action, the pe-
tition is dismissed and in-home services are provided. 1" If this occurs,
the child never has an independent investigation initiated for him or her;
such an investigation might reveal facts suggesting that formal supervi-
sion is needed rather than informal supervision.1
4
1
The state is intertwined with both the parent and the child, even
though all three are parties to the action and even though all interests
may not coincide. In addition, the state has separate economic and regu-
latory concerns that may further erode the child's rights.
The state has an economic interest in bargaining with the parent.' 46
The state might settle with the parent and amend the petition's language
if the parent will agree to a nolo contendere plea.'4 7 Typically, the settle-
ment between the state and the parent requires that the parent behave in
a particular manner. 148 When the state settles with the parent, the state
avoids the time and expense of a myriad of juvenile dependency court
hearings. 149
141. S. HONEA, supra note 27, at 68-69 (1980). See also supra notes 14-25 and accompany-
ing text.
142. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
143. CAL. WVELF. & INST. CODE § 330 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
144. Id.
145. Further, the parent may choose to waive counsel. I. § 317 (West Supp. 1990). If the
parent waives counsel, the presumption that the child's interests are being met by the balance
between the parent's counsel and the agency's counsel no longer applies.
146. Patton, supra note 56, at 321. See also supra, notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
147. Id. A nolo contendere plea is one in which the party pleading is not admitting or
denying the charges, but merely saying he or she will not contest the charges. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 545 (5th ed. 1983).
148. See, e.g., In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 834, 662 P.2d 922, 927, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464,
469 (1983) (children placed under jurisdiction of court and detained in foster homes; mother
told to get job, establish stable home, stay out of jail and show court she would be able to care
for children if they were returned to her); In re Jessica B., 207 Cal. App. 3d 504, 509, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 886-89 (1989) (child returned to home of mother but father not allowed to visit
without supervision by county welfare agency; father also required to admit he abused child).
149. Once the protective service agency determines that a child should at least be temporar-
ily separated from the parent, the agency files a petition with the juvenile court. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 311 (West 1984). A detention hearing is then set on the juvenile court calen-
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A full seventy-to-eighty percent of juvenile court dependency cases
are resolved between the county child welfare agency and the parent
without any contested hearing.-1 0 This is cause for concern because a
child not accorded independent counsel falls to the mercy of an agree-
ment made between the other two parties to the case."' Settlement itself
may not be problem-free. Even if the county child welfare agency and
the parent agree to a plan, the agency may fail to properly implement it,
thus putting the child at continued risk.' 2 A child welfare worker, al-
ready overburdened with cases, may be unable to adequately protect the
child.1
53
Further, the judgment and biases of the agency social workers may
also affect the proceedings. Social workers may rely too heavily on infor-
mation gleaned from others,"5 4 even though the information gathered
dar. Id. The parent may agree to plead guilty to the petition or may adjudicate the jurisdic-
tional facts. IM. § 355. If the parent did not receive actual notice of this hearing, the matter
may be continued. Id. § 321. At the detention hearing, the court determines whether the
petition should be sustained. Id. § 315. If the court sustains the petition, the next hearing will
be the dispositional hearing. Id. § 358. At the disposition, the evidence presented to the court
includes a social study of the child, with information compiled and written by the county child
welfare agency social worker. Id. This hearing may also be continued on motion by the par-
ent, child or court. Id Review hearings are held by the court to review the status of the child.
Id. § 366.2. If the child cannot be returned home, then a permanency planning hearing is held.
Id § 366.25. Jurisdiction over the child continues until the child is returned to the home of a
parent or is legally adopted. Id § 366.3. If jurisdiction is retained, the status of the child is
reviewed every six months. Id. At these hearings, the parent may be represented by counsel.
At any hearing, the parent may offer evidence to counter the agency's evidence. Id. § 350.
150. When a Child Needs Protection, (Cal. Community Colleges Foster Parent Training
Program),.1987 (videotape on file at College of the Canyons, Valencia, Cal.) [hereinafter When
a Child Needs Protection]. Essentially, the parties agree to modify the petition, which usually
minimizes the impact of the facts stated in the count(s). Demchak, supra note 17, at 26. This
process is similar to plea bargaining in criminal cases. Id.
151. Duquette & Ramsey, Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An
Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 J.L. REFORM 341, 355 (1987).
According to these authors, cases are settled in spite of the need of a child for "aggressive and
ambitious representation ... that addresses legal and nonlegal interests of the child." Id.
152. See id.
153. Kline, supra note 17, at 70. According to one study, the primary court-related respon-
sibilities of child welfare social workers consist of deciding which cases should be disposed of,
investigating facts to substantiate allegations, interviewing medical personnel or police officers
who may have pertinent information, developing a social history of the case, determining a
plan for the child and family, and implementing the court's eventual order. Russel, Role Per-
ceptions ofAttorneys and Caseworkers in Child Abuse Cases in Juvenile Court, 67 CHILD WEL-
FARE 205, 209 (1988).
154. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 636 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)). This risk of error due to human failing
is "'not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive
cost or interference with the ... process . . . ."' Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
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could be disputed."' 5 Thus, the child without independent counsel does
not have an advocate to dispute agency findings. One commentator has
written that "[d]espite [the Legislature's attempt] to codify good judg-
ment, human beings still have to make [the] decisions." '156
In one case, for example, a social worker's investigative report noted
that the foster home where the child resided had "lots of extra homey
touches, such as handiwork, decorations, and the aroma of freshly baked
cookies." 157 On the other hand, the social worker reported that the birth
mother resided in a "filthy home," and had lived with a "four-foot py-
tlion."' 8 It is arguable that the worker's subjective enjoyment of
"homey touches" influenced her recommendation to the court. A social
worker's affection for cozy middle-class existence is not the aim of the
Code; the California Legislature's focus in enacting Welfare and Institu-
tions Code sections 300 through 399 is on protecting abused and ne-
glected children.15 9
Social worker bias may taint the dependency court hearings. The
primary witnesses are social workers.16 By the time of the hearings,
these workers will have already investigated the family and addressed
familial needs, and yet are now expected to render objective opinions and
professional advice when testifying.161 Through these social workers,
then, the state may have the "power to shape the historical events that
form the basis for [the proceeding]." 162
The state's power to influence the court is evident in the provisions
of section 317.163 The county child welfare agency and the child will
share counsel if-there is no conflict declared by the court or if the court
decides that independent counsel would not be to the child's beneft.!' 4
As indicated above, 165 section 317 and the state's interests and practices
155. Id.
156. Siegel, Shadow of Doubt, L.A. TIMEs MAG., Nov. 19, 1989, at 12, 15. Of course,
individual judgments and biases would still exist where independent counsel was appointed.
However, independent counsel could make independent decisions in the best interests of the
child and focus on the need for safety and stability. Independent counsel for the child would
be investigating and advocating solely for the benefit of the child, and would take into account
both the parent's and state's stance.
157. In re Christina P., 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 122, 220 Cal. Rptr. 525, 527 (1985).
158. Id. at 124, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
159. See supra note 37 for the provisions of California Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 300.
160. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
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do not further the child's best interests because the state cannot singu-
larly focus on the child. Thus, when the child is represented by the state
agency's counsel, the recommendations made to the court are a hybrid of
compliance with state statutory obligations, the state's varied concerns
and finally, recognition of the child's best interests.
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis begins with an overview of two United States Supreme
Court cases which may provide a basis for asserting that allegedly abused
or neglected children have a constitutional right to independent counsel.
Next, the analysis addresses the reasons why effective independent coun-
sel will further children's best interests and fair proceedings, focusing on
California statutes and case law. This part of the analysis centers on
appellate cases which point out the conflict among the state, parent, and
child and the need for independent counsel. Finally, the author notes
that children will probably have to rely on the state legislature or the
United States Supreme Court to require independent counsel due to a
Supreme Court of California decision that denied independent counsel to
children in termination proceedings. Thus, the analysis concludes by re-
lying on United States Supreme Court precedent to establish the right to
independent counsel for every child entering the juvenile dependency
court system.
A. The United States Supreme Court: Support for a Constitutional
Right to Independent Counsel
The United States Supreme Court has not yet determined whether
due process requires appointment of independent counsel for children in
dependency proceedings. 66 However, in other contexts, the Court has
declared that due process entitles juveniles to fair proceedings. 167
1. Independent counsel for a minor in juvenile court
delinquency proceedings
In re Gault 6 involved a 15-year-old boy who was committed to an
166. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 43 n.10 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the notion of independent counsel in dependency
proceedings would require "consideration of interests different from those presented [in
Lassiter], and ... might yield a different result with respect to the right to counsel." Id. at 43
n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
168. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Arizona school for juvenile delinquents. 16 9 In appealing his detention,
the minor, Gerald Gault, claimed prejudicial error because he had not
been notified of his right to counsel.17 ° Gerald asserted that a part of
Arizona's Juvenile Code was unconstitutional because it called for taking
the youth from the custody of his parents and detaining him in a state
institution without requiring the Juvenile Court to appoint counsel.171
The Supreme Court of Arizona focused on what it believed to be the
adequacy of the state's Juvenile Code, which provided that the probation
officer would be the party advocating the minor's interests in juvenile
court. 172 Countering the state court, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the probation officer could not adequately represent Gerald's
interests because the probation officer initiated the proceedings and filed
the petition in the juvenile court.173 Thus, the Court held that minors in
juvenile delinquency court proceedings were to be accorded independent
counsel. 174
In its holding, the Court focused on the minor's individual needs
and rights. The Court observed that a juvenile delinquent before a court
needed "the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make
skilled inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist upon regularity of the pro-
ceedings .... ""I The Court noted that, from the juvenile court system's
inception, the system applied different procedural standards for minors
than those accorded adults. 176 These procedural differences, the Court
said, were intended to serve the minor's interests. 177 The system, the
Court noted, was geared toward providing the minor with the "care and
solicitude" of the state.178 In order to foster this cause, the proceedings
had been designed to be non-adversarial.
179
The Court went on, however, to point out that "[t]he absence of
procedural rules... ha[d] not always produced fair, efficient, and effec-
169. Id. at 4. Gerald was sent to a state school for delinquents after being charged ivith
making lewd phone calls, which violated Arizona's Criminal Code. Id. at 7-8. When taken
into police custody on this charge, he was still subject to probation as a result of involvement
with the stealing of a purse. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id. at 34.
172. Ide at 35. Under the Arizona Juvenile Code, the Court noted, minors who were to be
looked after by the probation officer included not only delinquent minors, but neglected and
dependent children as well. Id
173. Id. at 35-36.
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 14.
177. Id at 15.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 16.
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tive procedures."' 80 The Court reasoned that "loose procedures, high-
handed methods and crowded court calendars, . . . all too often, ha[d]
resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights."'' Unfair-
ness to minors, the Court feared, had resulted in "inadequate or inaccu-
rate findings offact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. "182 To the
Court, provision of counsel to minors in delinquency actions would af-
ford these minors a constitutionally adequate level of protection. 18 3
2. Discretionary provision of independent counsel for indigent
parents in dependency proceedings
Fourteen years after Gault, the Court addressed the issue whether
an indigent parent had a right to counsel in parental termination pro-
ceedings. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services18 4 involved an infant,
William,"' 5 who had been detained by the Durham County, North Caro-
lina child welfare agency after a report had been made to the agency that
the child had been medically neglected.186 The child was subsequently
placed in a foster home.' 87 Three years after the child's initial detain-
ment, the agency had petitioned the juvenile court to terminate parental
rights.' The mother, Abby Gail Lassiter, who was incarcerated with a
25-to-40 year sentence for second-degree murder,'89 had been served
with the petition and termination hearing notice.' 9 She had attended
the termination proceeding, but had not been appointed counsel.' 9 ' At
the conclusion of the termination hearing, the state court found that ter-
minating Lassiter's parental status was in the child's best interests. 92
Lassiter appealed, alleging that the court had erred by not appointing
counsel for her.' 93 She maintained that the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution entitled her to
counsel. 194
180. Id. at 18.
181. Id at 19.
182. Id at 19-20 (emphasis added).
183. Id at 36.
184. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
185. Id at 32 n.7.
186. Id at 22. The county child welfare agency in Durham County, North Carolina was
called the Department of Social Services. Id.
187. Id. at 32 n.7.
188. Id at 20-21.
189. Id at 20.
190. Id at 21.
191. Id. at 24.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id
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The Supreme Court began its analysis with the presumption that no
due process right to appointed counsel exists unless physical liberty is at
stake.19 However, the Court noted that due process could still require
that counsel be appointed if a personal freedom might be lost because of
the state's action.196 The Court said a parent's interest was great when
the state sought to end parental rights. 197 After determining that
Lassiter's personal freedom in parenting her birth child was affected by
the state's action, the Court balanced three interests against one another
to determine whether the state must guarantee counsel: 198 (1) the private
interests at stake; (2) the state's interests; and (3) the risk that the lack of
counsel would lead to erroneous decisions. 199
In balancing the interests, the Court noted that "[a] parent's interest
in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her paren-
tal status is... a commanding one." 2" However, the Court continued,
the state shared the parent's interest in an accurate decision and in the
child's welfare.20 1
Additionally, the Court recognized that the state's interest diverged
from the parent's because the state had an interest in avoiding "the ex-
pense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings
[counsel's] presence [could] cause.""2 2 However, the Court stressed that
the state's pecuniary interest could not vanquish important private inter-
ests, particularly when the costs to the state were de minimis. 203
Finally, the Court considered the risk of erroneously depriving
Lassiter of her child in the absence of appointed counsel.2 4 On this
point, the Court stated that the presumption that counsel should not be
appointed could only be overcome by strong parental interests coupled
with a high risk of error.205 In this particular case, the Court determined
that the presumption had not been negated because the parental interest
was low, 20 6 and thus Lassiter had not been erroneously deprived of coun-
195. Id. at 25-27.
196. Id. at 27.
197. Id.
198. Id
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 27-28.
202. Id at 28.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Id at 31.
206. The Court noted that Lassiter had shown little interest in William. Id. at 32. In addi-
tion, Lassiter had "expressly declined" to attend the initial juvenile dependency hearing. Id at
33. Further, after Lassiter was notified of the pending termination proceeding, she failed to
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sel.2 07 However, the Court noted that the Constitution might require the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in juvenile dependency court
termination proceedings in other circumstances.208 Whether counsel
should be appointed for indigent parents would be determined by the
trial court subject to appellate review.2 °9
Four Justices dissented. First, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, incorporated the majority's three-part balancing
process, 210 yet arrived at a different result.211 Justice Blackmun dis-
agreed with the majority's holding, and wrote that due process required
Lassiter to be accorded counsel.21 2 Using the majority's method, Justice
Blackmun determined that the risk of deprivation suffered by a parent
outweighed the state's interest in avoiding the cost and administrative
inconvenience that might result due to appointed counsel. 213 He empha-
sized that procedures had to be "devised to ensure that justice may be
done in every case."1214 Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority for
creating a case-by-case approach that "place[d] an even heavier burden
on the trial court, [which would now require the trial court] to determine
in advance what difference legal representation might make." '215
Justice Stevens, in his own dissenting opinion, stated that due pro-
cess required that counsel be appointed for indigent parents when paren-
tal rights termination was possible.21 6 Completely disapproving of any
ad hoc balancing method, Justice Stevens maintained:
The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the
pecuniary costs against the societal benefits. Accordingly, even
if the costs to the State were not relatively insignificant but
rather were just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors,
judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal
proceedings, I would reach the same result in this category of
contact her retained counsel. Id The Court emphasized that a trial court should not ignore
"a parent's plain demonstration that [she or he] is not interested in attending a hearing." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 31-32.
209. Id at 32.
210. Id at 37-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Id at 48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun suggested that the "due process
analysis takes full account of the fundamental nature of the parental interest, the permanency
of the threatened deprivation, the gross imbalance between the resources employed by the
prosecuting State and those available to the indigent parent, and the relatively insubstantial
cost of furnishing counsel." Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. Id at 50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 51 n.19 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting).
216. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cases. For the value of protecting our liberty from deprivation
by the State without due process of law is priceless.217
Lassiter's Court denied mandatory independent counsel to the indigent
parent in juvenile dependency court termination proceedings. However,
the holding was not a unanimous one. The Court could, therefore, hold
differently if a child alleged a due process violation because of the denial
of mandatory independent counsel.
B. California Statutory Construction and Case Law
Once a child enters the California juvenile dependency system, his
or her rights might be in danger. This is due to the "dual purpose" of
dependency hearings-the proceedings are designed, first, to protect the
welfare of the child and second, to safeguard a parent's right to properly
raise his or her own child.218 The Supreme Court of California has ob-
served that "[t]he Legislature... directed the courts to balance the inter-
est of the child in secure and sufficient parenting with the interests of all
parties in maintaining the family."219
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 does not re-
quire appointment of independent counsel for every child entering the
juvenile dependency court system.220 As noted above, current section
317 is inadequate even though it explicitly states that counsel will be
appointed at the court's discretion.22' The rationale behind several Cali-
fornia cases demonstrate the inadequacy of section 317 by noting the im-
portance of independent counsel.
1. In re Melissa S.
In re Melissa .222 involved former section 318 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code223 which required that independent coun-
217. Id. at 60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1979).
219. In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 836, 662 P.2d 922, 928, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 470 (1983).
220. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
221. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
222. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1986).
223. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (repealed 1987). Section 318 stated in pertinent
part:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 317, when a minor who is alleged
to be a person described in subdivision (d) of [former] Section 300 appears before the
juvenile court at a detention hearing, the court shall appoint counsel...
(b) The counsel appointed by the court shall represent the minor at the deten-
tion hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile court.
(d) The counsel shall be charged in general with the representation of the
child's interests. To that end, he shall make such further investigations as he deems
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sel be appointed for a child whose home was deemed unfit because of
"neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents."224
In Melissa S., the court of appeal held that the dependency court's failure
to appoint counsel for the child amounted to prejudicial error.225
a. the facts
A six-year-old child, Melissa, was taken into protective custody
when the child welfare agency of Kern County226 received an anonymous
report that the child's eleven-year-old sister, Wendy, had been sexually
molested by the girls' stepfather.227 After receiving this report, a social
worker interviewed both children.228 Melissa and Wendy told the social
worker that their stepfather had molested them.229 The children relayed
identical stories that same day to a sheriff's deputy.230 However, prior to
the detention hearing, Wendy retracted her story.231
The mother and stepfather attended the detention hearing.232 The
necessary to ascertain the facts, including the interviewing of witnesses, and he shall
examine and cross-examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory and dispositional
hearings; he may also introduce and examine his own witnesses, make recommenda-
tions to the court concerning the child's welfare, and participate further in the pro-
ceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child. In addition, the
counsel shall investigate the interests of the child beyond the scope of the juvenile
proceeding and report to the court other interests of the child that may be protected
by other administrative or judicial proceedings .... The court shall take whatever
appropriate action is necessary to fully protect the interests of the child....
Id. Section 300 of the Code, prior to a 1987 amendment, provided:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descrip.
tions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person
to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control....
(b) Who is destitute....
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical
deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, deprav-
ity, or physical abuse of either of his parents....
Id.
224. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318 (repealed 1987). See also Melissa S., 179 Cal. App.
3d at 1059, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
225. Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1057, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
226. This matter occurred in Kern County; there, the county child welfare agency is under
the auspices of the Kern County Welfare Department. Id. at 1050, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
227. Id at 1052, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
228. Id
229. Id. Wendy said the molestation had occurred one and one-half years earlier, prior to
the marriage of her mother and stepfather. Id. Melissa described the molestation, but did not
date it. Id
230. Id. at 1053, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
231. Id., 225 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
232. Id. at 1051, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
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mother was appointed counsel, as was the stepfather.233 Although the
mother and stepfather denied the allegations set forth in the petitions, the
petitions were sustained.234 On appeal, the children's appellate counsel
contended that the trial court had been required to appoint independent
counsel for the girls at the detention hearing and had failed to do so.
235
b. the court's analysis
Before the court of appeal, the county child welfare agency defended
its position that independent counsel for the children was not required,
focusing on the literal language of then-existing section 318.236 The
agency argued that section 318 was not applicable because the children
had not "appeared" at the detention hearing.237 The agency also argued
that even if counsel should have been appointed for the children, no prej-
udice existed because the count under section 300(d) 23' had been
dropped after negotiations between the agency's attorney and the
mother's attorney. 239 The court of appeal called this argument
,,ilogicah,,24o
In arguing that a minor who is not present at a detention or
other juvenile court proceeding is not entitled to appointed
counsel, the [agency] is actually contending that such a child is
entitled to no voice at all in a proceeding which will impact
upon the child's ongoing relationship with a parent.... 2 41
The court further stated that "[r]egardless of any 'plea bargain' agree-
ment between a welfare [agency] and a parent, if the child's interests are
unrepresented because counsel has never been appointed, the protection
required by statute is sabotaged."'242 Continuing, the court stressed that
both the welfare [agency] and the parent may have an interest
in letting the allegations of the petition and the substance of the
report pass unchallenged. This does not, however, assure that
the best interests of the minor are being served, precisely the
233. Id.
234. Id
235. Id. at 1054, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
236. Id
237. Id.
238. Under former section 318, a child who met the definition of section 300(d) was to have
independent counsel appointed for him or her in every case. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318
(repealed 1987).
239. Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1055-57, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
240. Id. at 1056, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
241. Id
242. Id. at 1057, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (emphasis in original).
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reason that independent counsel is statutorily required.2 43
The court of appeal noted that it was apparent "that the trial court might
well have benefitted from additional evidence, assembled and presented
by independent counsel, from the standpoint of the minor's best
interests." 2 "
The court's analysis is significant for several reasons: (1) the court
stressed that the children's best interests were not being served if the
parent and state agency could bargain away the children's rights; 245 (2)
the court noted the fallaciousness of ignoring children in proceedings
which greatly affect them;2' and (3) the court declared that a state
agency and a parent may have interests that do not coincide with those of
the children.247
2. In re Patricia E.
In re Patricia E. 24 also concerned the appointment of independent
counsel under former section 318.249 As in Melissa S. ,250 the court's ra-
tionale stressed the reasons independent counsel for children in depen-
dency cases should be required.251
a the facts
In this case, Patricia, a nine-month-old infant, was taken into pro-
tective custody after she was found to have sustained a skull fracture,
two broken wrists, a broken ankle and assorted contusions and abra-
252 Atrtnmawstsions. After ten months in a foster home, Patricia was returned to her
parents.25 3 Five months later, Patricia suffered a fractured right femur
and tibia.254 Once again, she was placed outside the parental home.2 5 A
little over three years later, when Patricia was approximately five and
one-half years old, a review hearing was held.25 6 A public defender was
appointed for the father, and county counsel was appointed to represent
243. Id. at 1059, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
244. Id. at 1058, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
245. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 24042 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
248. 174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1985).
249. Id. at 5, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
250. See supra notes 222-47 and accompanying text.
251. See Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 7-10, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 786-88.
252. Ijd at 4, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
253. Id
254. Id
255. Id.
256. Id.
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both the child welfare agency and Patricia.257 Patricia was not present at
this hearing nor was she interviewed by the agency or its counsel.258 At
the review hearing, the agency recommended that Patricia remain in a
foster home. 259 The court ordered that Patricia remain in the foster
home where she had been living, and the father appealed.26
b. the court's analysis
The appellate court explained that even assuming counsel could
jointly represent both the agency and the child (which the court did not
assume), there had to be a showing that there was no conflict between the
tWo. 2 6 1 The court stated:
[C]ounsel must certify that the preliminary duties of section
318 have been completed and that counsel is of the opinion,
wholly independent of the views and interests of his or her client
the welfare [agency], that joint representation will present no
actual conflicts of interest. This is the minimum we would allow
as an adequate affirmative showing warranting exercise of dis-
cretion to permit joint representation.262
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision,2 63 holding that
the lower court's failure to consider the need for appointment of in-
dependent counsel for Patricia was prejudicial. 261 In its reversal, the ap-
pellate court stated that the child had a statutory right to counsel, which
necessarily included a right to effective assistance of counsel.265 The
court emphasized that counsel dealing with the conflicting interests of
two parties to the action would be less effective in many ways.266 The
257. Id. at 4-5, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 784. The court of appeal noted that at the lower court
level there was no record of a showing of a conflict between the agency and the child. Id.
258. Id. at 5, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
259. Id. at 6-7, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 8, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
262. Id. (emphasis added). In a footnote, the court continued: "We imply no view on the
ability of a county counsel to make such a representation where the investigation of the case
reveals that reasonable persons could disagree regarding the appropriate position that the child
ought to take. This may place counsel in an ethical quandary." Id. at 8 n.7, 219 Cal. Rptr. at
787 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105
(B) & (C) (1983)).
263. 174 Cal. App. 3d at 10, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 9, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
266. Id. The court focused on the fact that the child had not been interviewed by counsel
or a representative of the agency, and that the child had not been in court during any of the
proceedings. Id. The court found that there were problems which might have been alleviated,
had independent counsel been appointed. Id. at 9-10, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
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court observed that independent counsel might not have made the same
recommendation to the court that the agency's counsel did. 67
The court's analysis is significant because: (1) the court stressed that
where counsel represents dual interests an actual conflict exists; 268 and
(2) the court acknowledged that the child's independent counsel may not
have agreed with the agency's recommendation.269
3. The role of counsel for a child in juvenile dependency
court proceedings
Determining the proper role of independent counsel is important to
safeguard the child's best interests. 270 The analysis of independent coun-
sel's function can be quite detailed.2 71 Although an all-inclusive analysis
goes beyond the scope of this Comment, it is clear that a statute that
merely accords mandatory independent counsel without adequate role
requirements would be meaningless.272 A statute requiring mandatory
independent counsel must set forth counsel duties that will assure the
child an advocate who will limit the detriment to the child.273
a; In re David C.: the proper role of counsel for a child
In In re David C,274 the court addressed the issue of the proper role
of a child's counsel.275 The court stressed that the role of a child's coun-
sel involved more than just acceding to the state's arguments.276
267. Id. at 7, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
268. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., In re David C., 152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 1206-08, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115, 125-27
(1984). See also Fraser, supra note 4, at 30 n.106.
271. See generally Guggenheim, supra note 122; Ramsey, Representation of the Child in
Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287
(1983).
272. See infra notes 352-58 and accompanying text for the provisions of the author's pro-
posed statute, which incorporates specific counsel duties. Current section 317(e) does delineate
duties that a child's counsel should perform to fully protect the child's interests. CAL. WELV.
& INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1990). Id. Counsel's duties include investigating to ascer-
tain the facts, interviewing witnesses, making recommendations regarding the child's welfare,
and participating in proceedings in a manner necessary to adequately represent the child. Id.
These are important and necessary duties. However, if the child is not accorded independent
counsel, these duties derive from the agency rather than from an independent investigation by
the child's sole representative.
273. Fraser, supra note 4, at 29.
274. 152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1984) (holding that superior court pro-
ceeding was inadequate in protecting fundamental rights of parents and child).
275. Id. at 1207, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
276. Id. at 1207-08, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
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i. the facts
David had come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when he
was fourteen months old.277 David was removed from his parents' home
primarily because he had been suffering from malnutrition." When
David was six years old, the county child welfare agency filed a petition
to terminate parental rights.279 In seeking to terminate, the agency al-
leged that returning David to his parents would be detrimental to him.28 0
At the termination hearing, David had been represented by independent
counsel.281 However, on appeal, David's parents asserted that David had
been denied effective assistance of counsel.2 82
ii. the court's analysis
The court addressed the issue of the proper role of counsel for a
child.28 3 The court was appalled at the conduct of David's attorney, not-
ing that he had not met with David or even questioned whether or not he
should have met with David, the birth parents or the foster parents.2 84
The appellate court stressed that "[m]erely agreeing with the
agency's assessments without conferring with the family and child in-
volved does not guarantee [competency ofj independent counsel for the
minor, nor does it do anything to foster the minor's best interests.... "285
The court stated that, at a minimum, independent counsel for a child
should review the case, interview the child and, in general, make an in-
formed judgment based on the client's interests.2z 6
The court's analysis is important because: (1) the court stressed that
David's counsel should have met with David as well as the birth parents
and foster parents;28 7 and (2) the court noted that the child's counsel is
incompetent if he or she simply condones the agency's determination
277. Id. at 1196, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1197, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 120. Termination proceedings are held pursuant to
section 232 of the California Civil Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1982).
280. David C., 152 Cal. App. 3d at 1195, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1206, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 126. The court noted that parents in custody proceed-
ings have standing to assert a child's right to effective counsel. Id
283. Id. at 1207, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
284. Id., 200 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. By the time of the termination hearing, David was old
enough to voice his opinions, as he was six years old. See id. at 1195, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
285. Id. at 1207, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
286. Id. at 1208, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The court noted that an informed judgment might
require independent medical and psychological assessment. Id
287. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
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with no independent analysis.2"'
b. In re Jessica B.: Agency denied counsel
Recently, the Court of Appeal of the Fifth District in California
held that the county child welfare agency was neither statutorily nor con-
stitutionally guaranteed counsel in juvenile dependency proceedings.28 9
If the holding in In Re Jessica B.2 90 were followed, a child may not be
accorded any legal representation.291
Section 317 gives the court discretion to appoint counsel for a
child292 and outlines specific counsel responsibilities. 293 However, as
noted above,2 94 a child under four years of age does not have to be inter-
viewed and thus would have difficulty meeting the requirements of sec-
tion 317 requirements.295 The Jessica B. court saw an interplay between
section 318.5296 and section 317 when it held that even the agency is
never guaranteed representation by counsel.2 97 If the holding in Jessica
B. were followed, it could completely destroy a child's chance of being
even peripherally represented by counsel. Under the court of appeal's
analysis, the only party statutorily required to have counsel appointed in
288. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
289. In re Jessica B., 207 Cal. App. 3d 504, 513, 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 888 (1989). In this
case, an eight-month-old child, Jessica, was severely injured while at home alone with her
father. Id. at 508, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 885. She was comatose when her parents brought her to
the hospital. Id. The father made varying reports as to how Jessica's injuries occurred. Id. at
508-09, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 885. Upon arrival at the hospital the father stated that Jessica had
been strangled by a crib toy. d. Later, the father told an investigating officer that he had
slipped while holding Jessica, dropped her, then fell on top of her. Id. Abuse was suspected,
and shortly thereafter dependency proceedings were initiated. Id.
At the detention hearing, the father entered a no-contest plea to an amended petition. Id.
The child was subsequently released to the mother, with the stipulation that the father could
only have visits with the child when a social worker was present. Id. at 509, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
886.
290. 207 Cal. App. 3d 504, 254 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1989).
291. The Jessica B. court cited current California Welfare and Institutions Code section
318.5. JessicaB., 207 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 888. The court said that the child
welfare agency would only be accorded counsel if two requirements were met. Id. The first
requirement, according to the court, was that the parent be represented by counsel; second, the
court held, the trial court must specifically request the presence of counsel. Id.
292. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
293. IM
294. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
295. These requirements include either that counsel would benefit the child, or a showing
that a conflict exists between the child and the agency. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c)
(West Supp. 1990).
296. Id. § 318.5.
297. Jessica B., 207 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
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every juvenile court proceeding is the parent.2 98 Thus, the child's "best
interests" could be advocated solely by the county child welfare agency,
itself potentially unrepresented by counsel.
c. In re Laura F: independent counsel for children in parental
termination proceedings
In In re Laura F.,299 the Supreme Court of California addressed
whether independent counsel for children should be required in parental
termination proceedings initiated under section 232 of the California
Civil Code.3co The high court could apply its Laura F. holding if an
action were brought to the court alleging that mandatory independent
counsel should be required for children in the juvenile dependency court
system.
The purpose of Civil Code section 232 is to irrevocably free a child
from parental care and custody.301 Thus, Laura F must be addressed
because parental termination proceedings are generally considered more
important than dependency proceedings due to the former's greater im-
pact on parental rights.30 2 In Laura F., the court determined that when
a county child welfare agency institutes termination proceedings, the
agency's counsel could "adequately represent the child's interests. '303
298. Id
299. 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662 P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1983).
300. Id. at 830, 662 P.2d at 931, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 473; see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 232
(West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
301. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West 1982). A child may be released from his parent's con-
trol, for example, if the child has been abandoned or abused by the parent, or the parent is
disabled due to alcohol, drug abuse, or mental incapacity, and familial reunification efforts
have failed. Id
302. The theory is that parental rights are being conclusively ended in termination proceed-
ings, rather than being merely temporarily obstructed. See Note, supra note 103, at 302-03.
However, although dependency proceedings are geared toward temporarily detaining children
in the state's custody rather than a permanent severance of parental rights, it has been termed
a constructive termination. Id
303. Laura F., 33 Cal. 3dat 840, 662 P.2d at 931, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 473. Laura and her two
siblings were removed from parental custody because of neglect. Id at 829, 662 P.2d at 923-
24, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 465. When the children had been with their parents, they had to sleep in
cars and beg for food. Id. at 834, 662 P.2d at 927, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 469. In addition, the
children had periodically been left with others: one child was given to a woman whose last
name was unknown to the mother; another was left with a woman who had been accused of
child neglect. Id. When taken into protective custody, Laura, three and one-half years old,
could not talk and had rotten teeth; Laura's eight-year-old brother functioned at a mental age
of less than four years of age; and Laura's younger sibling, a one-year-old girl, never cried nor
appeared to want affection. Id. Three years after the children were taken into protective cus-
tody, the state initiated and prevailed in an action to terminate parental rights. Id. at 829-30,
662 P.2d at 924, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66. The mother appealed. Id at 829, 662 P.2d at 924,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 465. One of the mother's arguments on appeal was that the court had erred
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One commentator has noted that the child may have a greater need for
independent counsel in dependency proceedings as opposed to termina-
tion proceedings. 3" However, based on Laura F., it is improbable that
the Supreme Court of California would determine that children in depen-
dency court should be granted independent counsel. Thus, without a
favorable United States Supreme Court ruling, children residing in Cali-
fornia need to look to the California Legislature to further the best inter-
ests standard and require independent counsel for every child.
C. A Child's Right to Independent Counsel in the Juvenile
Dependency Court System
1. United States Supreme Court precedent and the right to
independent counsel for children in the juvenile dependency
court system
It is difficult to predict how the United States Supreme Court would
react to a child's allegations that the lack of independent counsel in de-
pendency proceedings amounted to a due process violation. However, if
there were a constitutional challenge to section 317, the Court could
analogize to prior Court holdings and grant children the right to in-
dependent counsel.
In In re Gault,3 o5 the Court said that without the right to counsel,
juveniles in delinquency cases were deprived of fair proceedings and indi-
vidual fundamental rights, including the right to liberty.30 6 This was
true, the Court said, even though the minor had a state probation officer
looking after his interests.30 7 The Court specifically found that the pro-
bation officer could not act as counsel for the minor, essentially because
of the probation officer's conflict of interest.30 8 Instead, the court held, a
minor had to have his own counsel to make factual findings, to help in
understanding the law, and to insist on regular proceedings.3 °9
Like the minor in Gault, a child in the juvenile dependency court
in failing to appoint independent counsel for the children. Id. at 830, 662 P.2d at 924, 191 Cal.
Rptr. at 466.
304. Demchak, supra note 17, at 28.
305. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
306. Id. at 27, 38-41. The minor in Gault did have his physical liberty restrained; he was
committed to a state home. Id. at 27. However, the Court's analysis went beyond a require-
ment that physical liberty be affected before counsel had to be appointed. The Court stressed
that the juvenile system had been designed to maximize the best interests of the child. Id. at
15.
307. Id. at 36.
308. Id. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
309. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
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system also has state officers (i.e., county child welfare agency workers)
with the duty to protect the child's interests.310 However, as noted
above, these social workers have concerns and obligations which prevent
them from singularly focusing on the child's rights and interests.31'
Thus, like the probation officer in Gault, the agency's workers have a
conflict with the child's interests.312 In addition, without independent
counsel, a child involved in the dependency court system may be de-
prived of fair, regularly scheduled proceedings.31 3 The agency may also
fail to instruct its attorney to pursue legal avenues that may be in the
child's best interests.314
Using Gault, the Court could determine that the child in the juve-
nile dependency court system requires independent counsel to present
facts and evidence to pursue the best interests of the child and fair pro-
ceedings. As the Gault Court stressed, inadequate procedures, such as a
failure to require independent counsel for each child, could lead to inac-
curacy.3 5 Additionally, independent counsel would not be dictated by
the needs of any party to the action other than the child. Independent
counsel could thus serve as a "balancing force" between the agency in-
vestigations and the subjective analysis made by the parent.31 6
Detention by a juvenile dependency court system does deprive a
child of his or her liberty interest.31 7 Other than the physical liberty dep-
310. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 305-06 (West Supp. 1990).
311. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. See also Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497
(9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990) (holding dependency court social workers
have absolute immunity from liability, allowing workers to perform without fear of threat of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation).
313. The state or the parent may move to continue the case, which might be against the
child's best interests. Without independent counsel, the child cannot request that a continu-
ance not be granted.
314. For example, the agency may fail to timely pursue termination so that a child may be
adopted. Although California Welfare and Institutions Code gives the court leeway to order
termination proceedings when the child has been detained for twelve months, see CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 361.5, 366.25 (West Supp. 1990), it often takes the state two years or more to
initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. See, eg., In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662
P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1983); In re Terry E., 180 Cal. App. 3d 932, 225 Cal. Rptr. 803
(1986); In re Raymond H., 175 Cal. App. 3d 556, 221 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1985); In re David C.,
152 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1984); In re Susan M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 125
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975). The state's failure to pursue legal avenues means the state is ignoring
the reality that children need stable environments. Even though the state is subjecting the
child to uncertainty, the child without independent counsel is helpless to act against the state.
See Babcock 884 F.2d at 498.
315. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 19-20.
316. See Children of Divorce: Do They Have a Right to Counsel?, 3 CHILDREN'S LEGAL
RTs. J. Sept./Oct. 1981, at 29.
317. It cannot be forgotten that children detained by the juvenile dependency court system
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rivation, the child's liberty interest in familial autonomy is also affected
by the state's action.318  Additionally, it could be argued, based upon
Supreme Court precedent, that children have an individual liberty inter-
est in a secure, stable, long-term, continuous parental relationship.
319
The Court has stated that although due process is required in juve-
nile. proceedings, 320 the Constitution allows juveniles to be treated some-
what differently from adults. 21 In Schall v. Martin,32 2 the Court noted
that although juveniles have an interest in freedom, that interest is af-
fected by the fact "that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form
of custody. ' 323 In Schall, the Court rationalized that
[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity
to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to
the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the
state must play its part asparenspatriae.... In this respect, the
juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be
subordinated to the state's "parens patriae' interest in preserv-
are usually detained in places other than the home of the parent. Such detention may be an
unwarranted governmental interference with the child's due process liberty interest because
the child's physical liberty is impinged.
318. The state has stepped in, after all, and temporarily severed the family unit. However,
as a liberty interest, this might be deemed an interest shared and controlled by the parent. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Yet even if familial liberty is controlled by
the parent, the Court has also stated that familial autonomy cannot usurp individual constitu-
tional rights of children. See Parham v. J.R., 422 U.S. 584, 600-03 (1979). Thus, the liberty
interest in family autonomy, coupled with the child's individual rights, paves the way for the
Court to grant substantial weight to the child's liberty interest.
319. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. The importance of a stable parent-child
relationship is due to what the relationship gives to the child: it promotes intimacy, a way of
life, training, and love. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977).
The "emotional attachments" that develop between a child and the adult who cares for him or
her connote a liberty interest. Id at 854. It follows, thus, that the state unconstitutionally
impacts the child's interest in emotional attachments and thus impinges upon liberty any time
it removes the child from the parent or any other adult that cares for the child and to whom
the child has become emotionally attached. The state must, therefore, enact statutes that will
protect the child's liberty interests, further the child's best interests, and result in fair
proceedings.
320. Schal v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
321. Schall, 467 U.S. at 268. In Schall the Court held that in juvenile delinquency matters,
the state has an interest in protecting society as well as the juvenile, and thus was justified in
the pretrial detention of delinquent minors. Id at 255-64. In this 1984 decision, a class action
was instituted by juveniles who had been detained. Id. at 255-56. The class representatives
asserted that their due process rights were violated because of New York's statutory construc-
tion. Id at 255, 261.
322. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
323. Id at 262 (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11
(1982) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)).
1424
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
ing and promoting the welfare of the child.324
The Court concluded that, in the pre-trial detention of delinquent
juveniles, the state's statutory scheme was consistent with the due pro-
cess requirement that proceedings be fair.325 The Court did indicate that
there were times when "detention of a juvenile would not pass constitu-
tional muster. ' 326 In this case, however, the Court felt that juvenile de-
linquents needed to be detained prior to any adjudication because there
was a risk to the community as well as to the juvenile.3 27
Schall does not stand for the proposition that a child is always in a
form of custody and thus it follows that the state may ignore the child's
constitutional right to liberty. The Court was very specific that, in de-
taining the minors here, the state did so not only to protect the child, but
also to protect the state from future violence instigated by the child.328
In Schall, it might have been appropriate for the state to subordinate the
child's liberty interests. However, in juvenile dependency court, the
young child is not a danger to the state. The child has been detained
because of parental abuse or neglect, not because the child is violent.
Further, the Court noted that a juvenile's liberty interest may be
subordinated to the state's interest to further the child's welfare.329 The
child detained by the dependency court system is not in an "appropriate
circumstance" to deny the right to counsel at the time the child is de-
tained by the state because the child is not violent and the state's denial
of counsel does not further the child's welfare. Thus, denying the right to
counsel to a child in dependency court would violate the due process
requirement of fair proceedings. In juvenile dependency cases, therefore,
detention of a child without according the child independent counsel
should not "pass constitutional muster."
Even if the Court determined that a dependent child's physical lib-
erty was not affected by the state's detention, the Court could employ the
Lassiter due process balancing test.
The result of the three-part Lassiter test could provide a constitu-
tional basis for according the child independent counsel.330 The first part
324. Id. at 265 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 268.
326. Id at 273.
327. Id. at 255-64.
328. Id
329. Id. at 265.
330. If the Court followed Lassiter strictly, the constitutional requirement of independent
counsel for a child would be on a case-by-case basis. Presumably this presently occurs in
California through Welfare and Institutions Code section 317. However, a constitutional re-
quirement would elevate the child's right to counsel in every case. Presently, the California
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of the test examines the private interests at stake.3 31 Under this prong of
the test, the child's interests are much stronger than those of the indigent
adult parent. Not only does the child share the parent's interest in famil-
ial ties, but he or she also has an interest in emotional attachments, a
stable, loving home, and an interest in being free from emotional or phys-
ical abuse.332
The next consideration is the state's pecuniary interest.333 Consider-
ing the state's overriding interest in its citizenry, the state's pecuniary
interest is weak.334 The Lassiter Court stated that the state's economic
concerns could never override important private interests. As set forth
above, the child has many important private interests that would have to
be noted by the Court.335
The final prong focuses on the risks of erroneous decision if the child
is not accorded counsel.336 The risk to a child of erroneously detaining
or allowing the child returned home is great. The child could suffer per-
manent disabilities or even death. 337 This third factor weighs heavily in
the child's favor because the potential damage and danger to the child is
substantially greater than the parent's potential loss of the care and con-
trol of his or her child. In addition, the risk of error is great because the
child is compressed between the various state concerns, parental inter-
ests, and the state's conflicting obligations to both the parent and the
child.
Denying independent counsel for every child in the juvenile depen-
Legislature could determine that the child's procedural requirements in juvenile dependency
court proceedings could be met solely by the agency itself without counsel. If the Supreme
Court should hold that, at a minimum, the Constitution requires that appointment of in-
dependent counsel be considered on a case-by-case basis, California may be more willing to
statutorily grant each child in the juvenile dependency court system the same mandatory right
to counsel that the state now gives to the parent.
331. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. See also supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
333. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. See also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
334. The Lassiter majority noted that the state's interest in avoiding the costs of appointed
counsel could not overcome important private interests. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28. The Court
noted that, in the case of parental interests, the state's economic concerns were "de minimis."
Id As noted, a child has interests that go beyond a shared parent-child interest in the integrity
of the family. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text. Thus, the child's interests
might completely overshadow the state's lesser pecuniary concerns. As Justice Stevens
stressed in his dissent in Lassiter, in view of the child's interests, the financial and administra-
tive burden on the trial court to appoint counsel is a reasonable one for the courts to bear.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. See supra notes 314-19, 335 and accompanying text.
336. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. See also supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
337. See Bouknight, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4814; DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002; In re Patricia E.,
174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783, 784 (1985).
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dency court system is justified, it has been argued, because children's
needs are being met by the county child welfare agency.338 Others argue
that independent counsel should not be provided because children are
incapable of involvement in the adversarial process.339 There is a general
distrust of persons who advocate for children because children are not
viewed as capable of directing counsel and thus, the argument advances,
their attorneys cannot adequately represent the child's legal interests.3"
However, one commentator has noted "[i]f there are reasons to distrust
legal representation of children, there are reasons to distrust legal repre-
sentation of adults, and confronting both kinds of distrust may demand
more, not less, legal conversation. Courts could appoint multiple repre-
sentatives [for children] to offer contrasting views of children's rights and
interests. 3 41
Further, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier... but when
*.. the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and
care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to [tradi-
tion], it needlessly risks running roughshod over... important interests
... ,342 California's current statutory scheme fails to provide
mandatory independent counsel for every child entering the juvenile de-
pendency court system and thus, this author contends, ignores "present
realities. 3 43
As the Supreme Court noted in Gault, "[d]epartures from estab-
lished principles of due process have frequently resulted.., in arbitrari-
ness." 34  As California departs from the due process principle which
requires fair proceedings by failing to accord children in the juvenile de-
pendency court system independent counsel, the state has acted
unconstitutionally.
Current California Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 could
be constitutionally challenged by a child under United States Supreme
Court precedent. The challenge would be buttressed by the inexplicable
requirement that adult indigents-but not children (who are usually in-
338. See, eg., Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (1985).
339. Minow, supra note 26, at 1882.
340. See generally Guggenheim, supra note 122, at 76.
341. Minow, supra note 26, at 1890.
342. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (holding that due process guaranteed
unwed father hearing regarding parental fitness before children could be taken from him) (em-
phasis added).
343. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
344. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
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digent 34 5)-have the right to independent counsel.
2. California precedent and the right to independent counsel for
children in the juvenile dependency court system
By failing to require effective independent counsel for every child,
the California Legislature denies the right to an independent "voice
'"34
and ignores "present realities." 47 California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 317 has been written so that a child may only be given
independent counsel if the court determines that there is a need for
one.348 However, the courts have noted that neglected or abused chil-
dren need independent counsel.349 The California Legislature has yet to
pass a statute that addresses this need.
V. AMENDING SECTION 317: RECOMMENDED STATUTORY
LANGUAGE
The state has an economic interest in limiting expenditures of state
funds. However, this economic interest should not supercede the state's
interest in its citizenry. The state's pecuniary interest is not sufficient to
override certain liberty interests of the child, such as the right to be free
from abuse, the right to stability and the child's right to safety. 5 0 A
state's economic interest also does not nullify the collective interests of
the state, the parent and the child in a just judicial decision based on fair
proceedings. Neither does the state's economic concerns supplant the
state's utmost interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its
citizenry.
California needs to require that each child entering the juvenile de-
345. The term "indigent" refers "to one's financial ability, and ordinarily indicates one who
is destitute of means ... so as to be in want." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (5th ed.
abridged 1983).
346. See In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1056, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201 (1986).
347. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972). See also supra notes 56-65 and accompa-
nying text.
348. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1990).
349. See, e.g., In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1986); In re
Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1985); In re David C., 152 Cal. App. 3d
1189, 200 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1984). Independent counsel not only benefits the child by according
an independent voice, but also benefits the court. The court is benefitted because it receives
information from counsel who is ascertaining the facts, interviewing witnesses and making
recommendations based solely upon the best interests of the child.
350. See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 58 U.S.L.W. 4184 (1990);
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502 (1982); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See also supra notes
110-29 and accompanying text.
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pendency court system be accorded independent counsel to assure fair
proceedings and to further the child's best interests. Section 317 should
be amended to require independent counsel and should also clearly state
counsel duties.
A. Proposal: Provisions for an Amended Version of California Welfare
and Institutions Code
The California Welfare and Institutions Code should be amended to
require independent counsel for the allegedly abused and neglected child
entering the juvenile dependency court system. Counsel duties would be
clearly delineated 35 1 and require counsel's active participation in both the
factfnding and court-related process. The amended California Welfare
and Institutions Code section would be designated section 317.1 and
would provide:
(a) When a minor alleged to be a person described in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300 comes to the attention of
any state agency which has the duty to report suspected
abuse, the court shall appoint counsel for this minor prior
to the first detention hearing.352 The minor's counsel shall
meet with and interview the minor, regardless of the mi-
nor's age, taking into account the minor's age and cogni-
zance, to determine the minor's wishes and to assess the
minor's well-being. 353 Such interviews shall take place in a
351. A clearly written statute will minimize contrived arguments, such as the one made in
In re Melissa S. See In re Melissa S., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1055, 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 200
(1986) (child welfare agency argued children had not "appeared" per literal language of former
section 318); see also supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
352. As currently written, section 317 stresses that counsel will be appointed for the parent
if the parent cannot afford to retain his or her own counsel. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317
(West Supp. 1990). Obviously, it would be unusual for a child to be able to afford his or her
own counsel. Therefore, so as not to be ambiguous, the statute would clearly state that all
children will have counsel appointed to represent them.
In addition, counsel would be appointed and would interview the child when there is a
report of child abuse. This would further the best interests of the child by allowing the child to
speak to his or her counsel prior to the detention hearing. If the child is pre-verbal, independ-
ent counsel could at least independently assess and investigate circumstances that led to the
child being taken into protective custody. This would include the child's counsel interviewing
the child's designated agency social worker. By requiring the interview at this time, the child's
counsel would not be able to wait until the day of the detention hearing and then "look at the
case and wing it." See Kline, supra note 17, at 70.
353. Current statutory language requires only that counsel interview the minor if the minor
is four years of age or older. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1990). If the
statute is written to require visitation and assessment by counsel (even if the minor is too
young to be "interviewed"), then counsel will be more likely to depend on his or her own
assessment of the situation.
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quiet, private area.354 Prior to the interview, counsel shall
be provided with any reports or information pertaining to
the detention of the child.
(b) Counsel for the minor may not represent another party to
the action, including any state or county agency. Counsel
for the minor shall have had training in child development,
as required by California Business and Professions Code
section 28 and Welfare and Institutions Code section
16206.35s
(c) Counsel shall represent the minor at the detention hearing
and at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile court.
Counsel shall continue to represent the minor unless re-
lieved by the court for cause. If counsel is relieved by the
court for cause, substituted counsel shall immediately be
appointed for the child. The representation of the child
shall include representing the child in termination proceed-
ings and in those proceedings relating to the institution or
setting aside of a legal guardianship.
(d) The counsel for the minor shall be charged in general with
the representation of the minor's interests. To that end,
counsel shall make investigations35 6 to ascertain the facts,
including the interviewing of witnesses, and he or she shall
examine and cross-examine witnesses in both the adjudica-
tory and dispositional hearings; he or she may also intro-
duce and examine his or her own witnesses, make
recommendations to the court concerning the minor's wel-
fare, and participate further in the proceedings to represent
the minor's best interests. Counsel shall visit with and in-
terview the minor prior to every hearing. If necessary to
further the minor's interests, including the interests in
354. Requiring that the interview take place privately would stop the interviews that cur-
rently occur in "crowded, noisy hallways or busy entryways leading to the courtrooms."
Kline, supra note 17, at 70.
355. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 28 (West Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 16206 (West Supp. 1990). Both sections declare that the California Legislature intends to
ensure that professionals who deal with child abuse victims have adequate and appropriate
training. However, although section 16206 of the Welfare and Institutions Code mentions that
such training may include training in child development, the author would amend section
16206 to require that training necessarily include classes in child development.
356. Independent counsel should make its own investigations. This minimizes the danger
that minor's counsel will depend on the interviews and investigations conducted by the county
child welfare agency, police officers, and others with close attachment to the state.
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safety and stability, counsel shall initiate legal action
against any other parties.
(e) The court may fix the compensation to be paid by the
county for services of appointed counsel.
(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, counsel shall
be given access to all records relevant to the case which are
maintained by state or local public agencies. Counsel shall
be given access to records maintained by hospitals or other
medical or nonmedical practitioners or by child care
custodians.
B. The administrative burden of providing independent counsel
Recently, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors decided to
incorporate a cost-saving change and replace private lawyers who had
represented parents (and some children) in dependency court with a non-
profit legal corporation.357 This administrative change could minimize
the burden of providing independent counsel for each child entering the
juvenile dependency court system.
The proposed corporation would function in a manner similar to the
corporation that currently represents the Los Angeles Department of
Children's Services.35 If formed, the new corporation will satisfy cur-
rent section 317 requirements.359 The Board of Supervisors intend to
divide this corporation into three separate legal offices to protect against
conflicts-of-interest, which could occur if one office represents more than
one client in the same case.3 °
If the corporation is formed, one of the offices should be designated
as the office of independent counsel to represent children. A change in
the statute could thus be coupled with the office's designation for repre-
sentation of children. This system could be used in every county in
California.361
357. Guccione, County Trying to Form a New Legal Aid Group, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 25,
1989, § I, at 1, col. 4.
358. Id at 11, col. 2.
359. Id
360. L
361. Further, if the state adamantly feels as though it cannot afford any additional attorneys
in dependency court, perhaps counsel for the child welfare agency should be discontinued.
Current section 318.5, read literally, does not guarantee the agency's right to counsel. See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). See also In re Jessica B., 207
Cal. App. 3d 504, 254 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1989). The agency is statutorily guaranteed counsel
only if two requirements are met: (1) the parent is represented by counsel; and (2) the court
requests that counsel be appointed for the agency. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 318.5 (West
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VI. CONCLUSION
The California Welfare and Institutions Code should be amended to
require that all children be appointed independent counsel as soon as
they are taken into protective custody by the juvenile dependency court
system. Such an amendment is necessary in order to pursue the best
interests of children in dependency proceedings. Independent counsel
can actively pursue children's interests in stability and safety by advocat-
ing the children's interests in light of the parent or state's failings.
Section 317, as written, is vulnerable to constitutional attack on
grounds that a child's due process right to counsel is denied. After all,
the Due Process Clause was "designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from... government .... "362 Although the United
States Supreme Court typically defers to the states' judgment in the area
of child protection, it has also emphasized that society's perpetuation de-
pends on the "well-being" of its children.363 The Court has noted that
the well-being of society's children depends undisputedly on meeting the
needs of children. 3" The Court has also implied that states should estab-
lish law that will ensure the rights of children.365 A guarantee of in-
dependent counsel for all children will ensure protection of children's
rights more than the present practice, which involves the child sharing
counsel with a party who has conflicts with the child's interests.
The state must adhere to California's best interest standard to fur-
ther the state's interest in the health, safety and welfare of its children.
As this Comment has demonstrated, this best interest standard can only
be served if the state requires independent counsel for all children in the
juvenile dependency system.
Martha Heippie*
1984 & Supp. 1990). Certainly an educated social worker could be more capable of represent-
ing the agency's interest than a minor would be in representing him or herself.
362. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
363. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
364. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982).
365. Id.
* The author wishes to thank Dean Jan Costello for reading a draft of this Comment,
and Mark Mason for his patience, understanding, and encouragement.
[Vol. 23:1385
